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## XI. — Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη

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PHILOSOPHY delivers us from the illusion of metaphysics. We are freed from rhetoric only by the study of its history. And similarly the history of commonplaces must be written, if only to prevent us from mistaking a commonplace for a new and epoch-making thought.

The commonplace concerning the respective contributions of talent, study, and theory to successful virtuosity is known to every schoolboy in the formulations of Cicero, Horace, and Quintilian.<sup>1</sup> These ideas did not, of course, originate with Cicero and Horace. They had had a long history and were familiar not only to the pupils of Plato and Isocrates but to the sophists of fifth-century Athens. My reason for recalling this somewhat obvious fact is that the neglect of it has introduced no little confusion into recent discussion of the relation of Plato's *Phaedrus* to Isocrates' "Against the Sophists," and has led scholars of the eminence of Professor Saintsbury and Professor Sandys to attribute a purely imaginary significance to some clever verses of the comic poet Simulus. I propose, then, to sketch the history of the topic with special reference to these two questions. The verses of Simulus, which are simply a lively résumé of the conditions of success for a playwright, run as follows in Stobaeus, 60, 4, Meineke, II, 352 :

1 οὔτε φύσις ἱκανὴ γίγνεται τέχνης ἄτερ  
πρὸς οὐδὲν ἐπιτήδευμα παράπαν οὐδενί,  
οὔτε πάλι τέχνη μὴ φύσιν κεκτημένη.  
τούτων ὁμοίως τοῖν δυοῖν συνηγμένων

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Archias*, I, (1) ingenii (2) exercitatio dicendi . . . (3) ratio aliqua. Ib. 15 cum ad naturam eximiam atque illustrem accesserit ratio quaedam conformatioque doctrinae, tum illud nescio quid praeclarum ac singulare solere existere. Horace, *A.P.* 408 Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte | quaesitum est; ego nec studium sine divite vena | nec rude quid possit video ingenium. Quintil. I, prooem. 26 Nihil praecepta atque artes valere nisi adiuvante natura. Cf. the discussion in II, 19.

5 εἰς ταῦτόν, ἔτι δὲ προσλαβεῖν χορηγίαν,  
 ἔρωτα, μελέτην, καιρὸν εὐφυῆ, χρόνον,  
 κριτὴν τὸ ῥηθὲν δυνάμενον συναρπάσαι.  
 ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τούτων τις ἀπολειφθεὶς τύχη,  
 οὐκ ἔρχετ' ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τοῦ προκειμένου.  
 10 φύσις, θέλησις, ἐπιμέλει' εὐταξία,  
 σοφοὺς τίθησι κάγαθούς· ἐτῶν δέ τοι  
 ἀριθμὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν γῆρας ποιεῖ.

Professor Saintsbury, of course, knows that the ideas of the first three lines are commonplace. But their combination with the less obvious truisms of the remaining lines so struck his fancy that he pronounced the whole passage (*History of Criticism*, vol. I, p. 25) "not only a theory of poetry and poetical criticism, but one of such astonishing completeness that it goes far beyond anything that we find in Aristotle and is worthy of Longinus himself in his happiest moments." He adds that he finds it "very hard to believe that this was said in the fourth century before Christ. . . . The experience," he says, "is that of a careful comparer of more than one literature . . . ; it is the voice of Aristotle speaking with the experience of Quintilian." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the date of "Simulus" see Meineke, I, xiii; Kock, II, 444. There was a comic poet Simulus who brought out a play (title uncertain) Olym. 106, 3 — B.C. 354. See *CIG.* I, no. 231, p. 353. Pollux, x, 42, speaks of the *Μεγαρικὴ*, a play of Simulus. Demosthenes, *de Corona*, 262, refers to a tragic actor Simukkas, which, on the basis of Harpocration, Suidas and Σ(γρ.), has been changed to Simulus, and is now so written in some texts of Demosthenes. Athenaeus, VIII, 348, quotes from Theophrastus a criticism aimed at this Simukkas or Simulus. The comic poet and the tragic actor have sometimes been identified, but without reason, thinks Meineke, who cites contra Plato's discussion in the *Republic*, III, 359 A.

There is further the Simulus of Stobaeus, who quotes from him two fragments — the one in question, and another of ten lines in which the superiority of hearing over the other senses as a teacher of the good is affirmed.

There is a Simulus quoted by Theophilus of Antioch in his letters to Autoly-cus, III, 7, p. 208 (Otto) —

Κοινῶς ποιητὰς ἔθος ἐστὶν καλεῖν  
 καὶ τοὺς περιττοὺς τῇ φύσει καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς·  
 ἔδει δὲ κρίνειν.

Finally, there is a "Simulus the poet" quoted by Plutarch (about ten lines) in his *Romulus*, 17. Kock, II, 444, and Meineke think that the fragments of Stobaeus are not from Simulus the comic poet.

Professor Sandys, who as an editor of Isocrates must be aware that there is nothing really new or especially noteworthy in these ingenious verses, is nevertheless so carried away by Professor Saintsbury's enthusiasm that he spares a page of his closely measured space for them and translates them in full thus :

Nature of Art bereft will not suffice  
 For any work whate'er in all the world ;  
 Nor Art again, devoid of Nature's aid.  
 And, e'en if Art and Nature join in one,  
 The poet still must find the ways and means,  
 Passion, and practice ; happy chance and time ;  
 A critic skilled to seize the poet's sense.  
 For, if in aught of these he haply fail,  
 He cannot gain the goal of all his hopes.  
 Nature, good will, and pains, and ordered grace  
 Make poets wise and good, while length of years  
 Will make them older men, but nothing more.

Such are the accidents and ironies of history. Simulus himself would have been intensely amused could he have foreseen that his plausible résumé of current truisms would after two thousand years give him a place among the great thinkers of antiquity in the history of philosophic literary criticism. But since the thing has happened, I propose to reestablish the true character of these verses, first by a somewhat broader study of the whole question concerning nature, theory, and practice, and lastly, at the close of this paper, by a commentary on the terms of rhetoric or literary criticism found in the remainder of the passage.<sup>1</sup>

The opposition of talent and teaching is evidently a subdivision of the general antithesis of nature and art or nature and convention. We find traces of it already in the more or less authentic sayings of fifth and sixth century poets and sages, and the Sophists who succeeded them. We may find a hint of it, if we please, in Hesiod's

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτῷ πάντα νοίῃσῃ, etc.

(*Works and Days*, 293. Cf. also 410 with Pind. *Isthm.* 5, 67.)

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 197 sqq.

Theognis' apparent self-contradiction<sup>1</sup> was the text of the later debate on the possibility of teaching "virtue," with which we are not directly concerned.<sup>2</sup> Pindar's exaltation of φύσις, and his contempt for the διδασκαὶ ἀρεταί are well known.<sup>3</sup> Yet in his praise of the trainer he almost anticipates the later formulas of the rhetoricians. *O.* 10, 22 :

θήξαις δέ κε φύντ' ἀρετᾶ ποτὶ  
πελώριον ὁρμάσαι κλέος ἀνήρ.<sup>4</sup>

Bacchylides also has a word to say for the μελέτη of the trainer (12, 192). To Periander is attributed the saying μελέτη τὸ πᾶν (Diog. Laert. 1, 99). Epicharmus (Diels, fr. 40, p. 99<sup>1</sup>, p. 96<sup>2</sup>) perhaps repeats Hesiod when he says :

φύσιν ἔχειν ἀριστόν ἐστι δεύτερον δὲ [μανθάνειν].<sup>5</sup>

In which case there is perhaps no contradiction when he says (fr. 33.): ἁ δὲ μελέτα φύσιος ἀγαθῶς πλέονα δωρεΐται, φίλοι, which may be compared with Critias (fr. 9): ἐκ μελέτης πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί, and with Democritus (fr. 242, Diels): πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος. To Democritus is also attributed the saying that teaching creates (a second) nature: διδασχὴ . . . φυσιοποιεῖ. This thought, repeated in the well-known lines of Euenos (Ar. *Eth. Nic.* vii, 1152 a, 32):

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ  
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι,

has a long history.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 35-36 and 435-8. Cf. Schmidt, *Ethik der Griechen*, 1, 158.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Plato, *Meno*, 95 D. Introduction to Fritzsche-Stallbaum, *Meno*, pp. 11-13.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. commentators on *O.* 1, 94; 10, 107; *Nem.* 3, 41.

<sup>4</sup> See *Isthm.* 5, 73 and my note on Horace, *Odes*, iv, 4, 33. The image of the whetstone is made explicit in *A. P.* 304 *Ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum | reddere quae ferrum valet exors ipse secandi*. It is attributed to Isocrates by [Plutarch] *Orat. Vitae*, 838 E. Sextus Empiricus (Bekker, p. 678, 14) refers to it as a commonplace of teachers who cannot speak. And Chaucer, *Troilus and Criseyde*, 1, 631, puts it quaintly :

"A whetstone is no kerving instrument,  
But yit it maketh sharpe kerving toles."

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Xen. *Cyn.* 13, 4.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. perhaps *eis ἥθος*, Empedocles, Diels, 110, 5; Plato, *Rep.* 395 D *αἱ μὴ ἥσεις*

With the advent of professional teachers of medicine or sophistry these ideas are more fully developed. One of the completest statements is found in the νόμος (Littré, iv, 638):  
 χρὴ γὰρ ὅστις μέλλει ἱητρικῆς ξύνεσιν ἀτρεκέως ἀρμόζεσθαι  
 τῶνδ' ἐμιν ἐπήβολον γενέσθαι. φύσις, διδασκαλίας, τόπου εὐ-  
 φυνέος, παιδομαθίης, χρόνου. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν πάντων δεῖ φύσιος  
 . . . ἐτὶ δὲ φιλοπονίην προσενέγκασθαι ἐς χρόνον πουλὺν ὅπως  
 ἢ μάθησις ἐμφυσιωθεῖσα δεξιῶς τε καὶ εὐαλδέως τοὺς καρποὺς  
 ἐξενέγκηται. To Protagoras is attributed (Diels, fr. 10) μηδὲν  
 εἶναι μῆτε τέχνην ἄνευ μελέτης μῆτε μελέτην ἄνευ τέχνης, and  
 (Diels, fr. 3) φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δέεται . . . ἀπὸ  
 νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν, which in the English  
 edition of Gomperz (I, 441) is misleadingly rendered "Teach-  
 ing requires natural disposition and exercise, and must be  
 begun in youth." The διδασκαλία, of course,\* refers to the  
 instruction of the recipient, not the profession of the teacher.  
 The necessity of παιδομαθίη we have just met in the νόμος.  
 Plato emphasizes it in *Rep.* 467 A and *Laws* 643 B. There  
 is a hint of it in Phocylides, fr. 11 χρὴ παῖδ' ἐτ' ἔοντα καλὰ  
 διδάσκειν ἔργα. And it became a commonplace,<sup>1</sup> cf. *Anon.*  
*Iamb.* infra, p. 192.<sup>2</sup>

Euripides played with these ideas as with all ideas of the Zeitgeist. After Decharme, Nestle, and Masqueray it is hardly necessary to enter into details. But Dümmler's attempt to point out Euripides' precise Sophistic "sources" may complete our list of preliminary illustrations and at the same time serve to exemplify a too prevalent philological method. The Sophist Antiphon (fr. 134 Bl.) says:

πρῶτον οἶμαι τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ παιδευσίς· ὅταν γάρ τις πράγμα-  
 τος κἂν ὁπουοῦν τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ποιήσῃται, εἰκὸς καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ὀρθῶς  
 γίγνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τῇ γῇ ὅσον ἂν τις τὸ σπέρμα ἐναρσῶσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ

. . . εἰς ἔθνη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται; Nauck, fr. adespot. 516 μελέτη χρονισθεῖσ' εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται; Plut. *de San.* 18; Aristotle, *de Mem.* 452 a 30 τὸ δὲ πολλὰ-  
 κίς φύσιν ποιεῖ; Theophr. *C. P.* II, 5, 5 τὸ γὰρ ἔθος ὥσπερ φύσις γέγονε; Longinus,  
 22, 1; Cic. *de Fin.* v, 25; Quintil. I, 2, 8 fit ex his consuetudo, deinde natura;  
 Montaigne, *Essays*, III, 10; Pascal ap. Matthew Arnold, *God and the Bible*, p. 125.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Klein, *Praxiteles*, p. 11. Quintil. I, 12, 10.

<sup>2</sup> The comic poets applied the principle to Lucian's "Art" of the parasite. See Antidotus in Athen. vi, 240 B, and Sosipater, ib. ix, 377 F.

ἐκφορα δὲ προσδοκᾶν, καὶ ἐν νέῳ σώματι ὅταν τις τὴν παίδευσιν γενναίαν ἐναρόσῃ, ζῇ τοῦτο καὶ θάλλει διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ αὐτὸ οὔτε ὄμβρος οὔτε ἀνομβρία ἀφαιρεῖται.

Dümmler (Proleg. to Plato's *Rep.* p. 23) finds a close parallel to this in the lines of Euripides (*Hec.* 592 sqq.):

οὐκοῦν δεινὸν εἰ γῇ μὲν κακῇ  
 τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θεύθεν εὖ στάχυν φέροι  
 χρηστὴ δ' ἁμαρτοῦς ὦν χρεὼν αὐτὴν τυχεῖν  
 κακὸν δίδωσι καρπὸν; ἄνθρωποι δ' αἰεὶ  
 ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακός  
 ὁ δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλὸς οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὑπο  
 φύσιν διέφθειρ', ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ' αἰεὶ;  
 ἄρ' οἱ τεκόντες διαφέρουσιν ἢ τροφαί; etc.

The acceptance of such parallels is the end of all serious criticism. Euripides finds a paradox in the fact that the crops of good or bad soils are changed by circumstances, but the fruits of a good character are constant. Antiphon illustrates the importance of education, and especially early education, by the example of the soil in which good seed is sown. The two passages have nothing in common except the comparison of man to the soil, which is a commonplace in Pindar (*Nem.* 11, 39) and is elaborately worked out in the Hippocratean νόμος 3. The true parallels to Antiphon Dümmler overlooks altogether. They are for the thought Plato, *Rep.* 377 B ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον ἄλλως τε καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἀπάλῳ ὀτφoῦν, and 453 A; and for the almost proverbial turn "a good beginning is likely to bring a good ending," *Rep.* 453 A ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἂν κάλλιστά τις ἀρχόμενος ὥς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ κάλλιστα τελευτήσκειν, with Pindar, *Pylh.* 1, 34 ἀρχομένοις . . . εὐοικότα γὰρ καὶ τελευτᾷ φερτέρου νόστου τυχεῖν. Plato's and Antiphon's thought is very nearly that which Pope expresses with a still different image:

"'Tis education forms the common mind :

Just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined."

All the ideas and distinctions, then, which we have been considering were perfectly familiar to the fifth century, and any writer might allude to them or play upon them. The sophists

and rhetoricians, however, made special use of them in the protreptic and apologetic literature in which they defended the new learning or vindicated the profession of teacher from misconceptions. They had first to prove the utility of any theoretic teaching against the practical men and conservatives, of whom the Platonic Laches is a type. By a sort of malicious fatality<sup>1</sup> it often happened that the professor of fencing could not fight, and the prize pupil of the rhetorical school could not make a speech. The Platonic Laches anticipates the arguments of the self-made millionaire who "has no use" for a college education. Have you not seen, he asks, men without teaching prove better craftsmen than those who had been taught? And Isocrates candidly admits the fact.<sup>2</sup> Similar arguments were used to disprove the reality of an art or science of medicine, as appears from *περὶ τέχνης* 5 and 6.

In the second place, the more sober teachers guarded themselves against the accusation of charlatanism by the warning that they did not promise impossibilities and did not claim to be able to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Protagoras, in the dialogue that bears his name, says (328 B) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὶ δλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν. And Isocrates protests against excessive expectations in the same vein in 13, 2-5 and 11, and in 15, 193. The rational conclusion of the whole matter we shall find in Isocrates. But it is evident both *a priori* and from the fragmentary tradition that he was not the originator of the arguments to which he gives so systematic and so convincing a form. The combinations by which scholars have attempted to reconstruct and assign names to early apologetic and protreptic literature may be more ingenious than convincing. But that such a literature existed is abundantly evident from the allusions in Plato's *Sophist* and *Euthydemus*,<sup>3</sup> in Isocrates' *Demonicus* (3),<sup>4</sup> in the "Apology for Medicine" which Gomperz on inadequate evidence attributes to Protagoras,

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Laches*, 183 C ὅσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες. Cf. Cicero's *dedita opera*.

<sup>2</sup> 13, 14.

<sup>3</sup> *Euthyd.* 275 A, 282 B; *Sophist*, 246.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Leipziger Studien*, XI, 210 sqq.



and from passages in the so-called *Anonymus Iamblichi*.<sup>1</sup> The *Anonymus* says (Diels, p. 577<sup>1</sup>): If a man desire to work out anything to the end in the best manner,<sup>2</sup> alike whether it be wisdom, bravery, eloquence, or virtue in whole or any part, these are the conditions of success. Natural capacity for it (*φύνη*) is the first requirement, and this must be attributed to fortune. This assumed, the conditions that depend upon the man himself are that he should be a lover (*ἐπιθυμητής*) of things fair and honorable, fond of toil, a learner early in life, and abiding in the pursuit a long time. If even one of these conditions shall be lacking it is not possible to bring anything to the highest perfection. But where all are united, whatever a man practises is unsurpassed.

In this passage, then, we have *φύσις*, *ἐπιθυμία* (*Simulus' ἔρως*), *χρόνος*, *παιδεία*, *παιδομαθίη* implied in *πρωιαίτατα μανθάνονται* and *μελέτη* implied in *φιλόπονον* and *ἀσκή*. Lastly note Isocrates' word *ἀνυπέρβλητον*,<sup>3</sup> corresponding to Cicero's *nescio quid praeclarum ac singulare* and to Sir Thomas Browne's "When industry builds upon nature, we may expect pyramids." Further on the writer adds with some repetition that a man may equal his teacher in the mere theory of the *τέχνη* in brief space, but real excellence (*ἀρετή*) is the product of long training begun in youth.

In the *περὶ τέχνης* (9) the apologist for medicine says in effect: There is such a thing as a scientific treatment of disease. Not that it is easy, but that the cures have been discovered. They have been discovered not for every one who

<sup>1</sup> It is the general opinion that we have imbedded in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* a genuine piece of fifth-century prose. But the original "fragments" collected by Blass contained much that was obviously taken directly from Plato and Isocrates. Since then, the lines have been more sharply drawn. But I still scent "Reminiscenz Greek" here and there. E.g., the words *οὗτος οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ κόσμῳ περικειμένῳ τὴν δόξαν θηρᾶται*, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ (Diels, p. 578<sup>1</sup>, 39) remind me of *Phaedo*, 114 Ε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη, etc. I think we must limit the amount of directly quoted fifth-century prose still further, and admit the hypothesis that what there is came to Iamblichus through an intermediate Platonizing source.

<sup>2</sup> *ἐξεργάσασθαι*, Isoc. 2, 25; 4, 10.

<sup>3</sup> 15, 191 ἀμφοτέρω τε γενόμενα περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνυπέρβλητον ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποτελέσειεν.

may merely desire to know them, but for those who are able to learn. And those are able who have not lacked the opportunity of education and whose nature is not incompetent. Here ἐξεύρηται postulates a body of doctrine (ἐπιστήμη). The terms παιδεία and φύσις complete the trinity, and βουληθείσιν implies ἐπιθυμία. The phrase τὰ τε τῆς παιδείας μὴ ἐκποδών may refer to the indispensable χορηγία, or more generally to such opportunities as the presence in the city of a good teacher.

We are now prepared to see that Isocrates' admirable summing up of the whole question offered nothing new to any well-informed fourth-century reader. In the κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν, after satirizing quite in the Platonic vein the pretensions of the Sophists who profess to teach all "virtue" for a few minae, and take pledges for the payment of their fees from the very men to whom they have imparted justice, Isocrates adds sensibly (14-15): "If it is not enough to censure others, but if I must set forth my own views, I think that all reasonable men will agree with me that many professional students have failed to become experts, while others who have never gone to school to any Sophist have turned out able speakers and politicians. The reason is that the actual faculty and ability to do things is developed only in those who are endowed by nature and exercised by experience. Education, theoretic instruction, will make men of this sort more scientific and more fertile in resource. For what they now hit upon tentatively it teaches them to apprehend more readily. But instruction can never make able contestants (ἀγωνιστάς) or artistic writers out of men of inferior natural capacity, though it will bring them to surpass their natural selves and improve their intelligence in many ways."

To make his meaning more explicit he adds that it is easy to learn the general theory of rhetoric, if one applies to the right teacher (cf. the *Anonymus* above), but that the practical application of the precepts, the recognition of the καιρός or opportune season for their employment, and the mastery of a finished style, demand much care and attention (ἐπιμελείας), and are the task of a strenuous and sagacious spirit (ψυχῆς

ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς). To the final result the student must contribute<sup>1</sup> his natural capacity, willingness to learn, and submission to discipline; the teacher his science and the virtuosity that makes of him a good model of style. Then follows the sentence the substance of which we have met in the *Anonymus* and shall find repeated in most later discussions of the subject. In so far as any of these conditions is lacking the result will be inferior — when they are all united it is perfect: καὶ τούτων μὲν ἀπάντων συμπεσόντων τελείως ἔξουσιν οἱ φιλοσοφούντες· καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν ἐλλείφθῃ τι τῶν εἰρημέων, ἀνάγκη ταύτη χεῖρον διακείσθαι τοὺς πλησιάζοντας.

The *Antidosis* (194 sqq.) quotes this passage in full with further amplifying comment. There Isocrates first lays down the three conditions of success περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας and κατὰ πασῶν . . . τῶν τεχνῶν, and in the case of rhetoric specifically affirms that φύσις is the most important. Then, after quoting the tract against the Sophists to prove that his claims were equally modest and reasonable when he issued the first programme of his school, he goes on to defend his philosophy against all opponents of the higher education.

A well-known passage of Plato's *Phaedrus* (269 D) sums up all the main points and nearly all the catchwords of Isocrates: The practical faculty of the finished contestant (ἀγωνιστής) may and must depend upon the same conditions in rhetoric as in other matters. If you have to build upon the natural capacity for oratory, you will be an eminent speaker when you have added (προσλαβόν) to this science (ἐπιστήμη) and training or study (μελέτη). Whichever of these is lacking, you will be in that respect incomplete. So far as it is an art or science, I do not think the method of Lysias and Thrasymachus the true one. To this he adds in 272 A Isocrates' καιρός in the words προσλαβόντι καιροῖς, etc.; and φιλοπονία and χρόνος are implied in πολλῆς πραγματείας and μακρὰ ἢ περίοδος, 273 E-274 A. On account of our natural tendency to regard Plato as the more original thinker many scholars have assumed that the passages which I have quoted from Isocrates

<sup>1</sup> 15, 188 εἰσενέγκασθαι τὴν φύσιν ὅταν δεῖ. Cf. the medical writer in νόμος: ταῦτα ὧν χρὴ ἐς τὴν ἱητρικὴν τέχνην ἐσενεγκαμένους.

are an imitation and expansion of these words. Others think that Plato is summarizing the doctrine of Isocrates and acknowledges his indebtedness by complimenting him by name later in the dialogue (278 E). Either view is conceivable, and either may be made plausible by special pleading. Neither can be proved. As it is not probable that the two passages are strictly contemporaneous, one writer was presumably cognizant of the other's work. But as the passages cited above show, as Gomperz points out in his note on *περὶ τέχνης*, and as I have argued in *Unity of Plato's Thought* (note 596, p. 78), there is nothing in either of which the sufficient suggestion is not found in the apologetic and protreptic literature of the day. This is perhaps implied in Plato's careless phrase *ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα*. The originality of a work so surpassingly rich in suggestion as is the *Phaedrus* does not depend on these links of commonplace lightly assumed in passing. Plato himself mentions the three prerequisites of the *ἰκανὸς ἀγωνιστής* in *Rep.* 374 D E, and distinctly implies them in 535 A D (*παιδεία, φύσις, φιλοπονία*), and they occur also in Thucydides I, 121, not to speak of Euripides. That *ἐπιστήμη* means more for Plato than it does for Isocrates is true, but is nothing to the point. For Plato it is the true knowledge of the dialectician concerning the question in hand, or, as a basis for a science of rhetoric, it is dialectics and psychology. For Isocrates it is mainly the precepts of his own rhetoric. But Isocrates, when dealing with other studies (15, 187), speaks of *τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣτις ἂν ᾖ περὶ ἐκαστου*, and Plato contemptuously admits the knowledge of the conventional rhetoric in the words (272 A) *προσλαβόντι . . . βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεεινολογίας*, etc. If the relative dates of the treatises are to be fixed at all, it must be by the parody of the *Panegyricus* in the *Phaedrus* (267 A) and that of the *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν* in the *Gorgias*, 463 A.<sup>1</sup> Minor disputable

<sup>1</sup> For Isocrates' *ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς* Plato maliciously substitutes *στοχαστικῆς*. Dümmler thinks it a coincidence in banal commonplace, Gomperz assumes a common source, and Dr. Wilhelm Süß, whose *Ethos* has just come to hand, thinks, p. 20, that both are quoting Gorgias, and can account for the variant only by the hypothesis that Gorgias in his rhetorical manner used both

parallels and coincidences in commonplace will certainly not suffice, if these fail. The question is very slightly complicated by the problem of the date of Alcidas' *περὶ σοφιστῶν*, a clever plea for *ex tempore* in preference to written speech. He touches our theme but slightly in his frequent references to *καιρός* (natural in a pupil of Gorgias), and in the argument that *ex tempore* speech demands more both of *φύσις* and *παιδεία* than the easier task of leisurely composition. There is further coincidence with the *Phaedrus* in the contrast between the living speech and the dead written word and in the suggestion that formal literary composition is not a serious occupation — it is either a *παιδιά* or a *πάρεργον*. Another passage (12) is either the answer to or the provocation of a polemic passage in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (11). And the remarks on the lifelessness of the written letter have been compared with Isocrates' attack in the tract against the Sophists on those who profess to teach rhetoric as mechanically as men teach *γράμματα*.<sup>1</sup> These facts hardly suffice to date Alcidas relatively to either Plato or Isocrates. If the *Panegyricus* passage is, as Blass thinks and as seems probable, a reply rather than a challenge to Alcidas, then Alcidas would on our view *a fortiori* precede the *Phaedrus*. But these interesting minor questions of philological controversy<sup>2</sup> must not obscure the main points, which are: (1) The originality of the *Phaedrus* as a whole is not involved. (2) If Plato's direct parodies are not a proof, no minor coincidences are of any significance — they may result from the use of older sources or from the conversation and gossip of the schools. (3) In any case the ideas and terminology of the first half of the *Simulus* passage were common property at the beginning of the fourth cen-

words: "da ein Grund für Änderung weder für Isokrates noch für Plato ersichtlich ist." The ground of course is the depreciatory suggestion of *στοχάζεσθαι*. Cf. *Gorg.* 464 C οὐ γροῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασάμενη.

<sup>1</sup> 13, 10 ἀλλὰ φασιν ὁμοίως τὴν τῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμην ὥσπερ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων παραδῶσειν. Dr. Süß and some other scholars read *πραγμάτων* for *γραμμαμάτων*. But this reading rests on a complete misunderstanding of section 12, which rightly interpreted absolutely requires *γραμματῶν*.

<sup>2</sup> See now Süß, pp. 30 sqq., Gercke, *Hermes*, xxxii, 341 sqq., and *Rhein. Mus.* liv, 404 sqq., and Hubík, *Wiener Studien*, xxiii, 234 sqq.

tury. That is enough for our purpose. I will not stop here to collect further illustrations from Aristotle, the post-Aristotelians, and the later rhetoric, but will conclude with a brief commentary on the other terms found in Simulus' summary, beginning with l. 5, *supra*, p. 186.

Προσλαβεῖν in l. 5 we have already met in the *Phaedrus*, 269 D. It is almost a *vox propria* in this connection. Cf. Soph. fr. 1019, 4, Nauck, p. 356 παιδεύματα προσλαμβάνειν; [Demosth.] 61, 42 ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντα φύσις βελτίων γίγνεται παιδείαν προσλαβοῦσα τὴν προσήκουσαν; the Γένος Ἀντιφώντος, Blass, *Antiphon*, 39 φυσικῇ (δὲ) δεινότητι τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως μελέτην προσλαβών; Isoc. I, 18 προσλαμβάνειν ταῖς ἐπιστήμας, where, however, the construction is different; and I 5, 18 ἔπειτα . . . λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

The word χορηγίαν may conceivably stand in apposition with all that follows. It may simply mean the dramatic χορηγία, or more probably it may be the well-known Aristotelian metaphor derived therefrom. In that case it includes the opportunities expressed in the περὶ τέχνης by the phrase τὰ τῆς παιδείας μὴ ἐκποδών (*supra*, p. 193).

Ἔρωτα, repeated by θέλησις (l. 10), is the enthusiasm or love of the subject without which nothing great can be achieved. As such it might be referred to the *μανία* of Plato's *Phaedrus*, 245 A. But here it rather recalls the *προθυμία*, *ἐπιθυμία*, or *studium discendi* which all teachers demand as the first condition of success. Cf. Plato, *Theaetet.* 148 D, *Rep.* 475 C, *Epistle* 7, 345 D *ἐπιθυμία*, with Bertheau's note; Alcinous, *εἰσαγωγή* I, πεφυκέναι δὲ τοῦτον χρὴ πρῶτον . . . ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ἐρωτικῶς; Quintil. I, 3, 9 *Studium discendi voluntate constat*.

Μελέτη and its virtual synonym ἐπιμέλεια have been sufficiently illustrated above (pp. 187 sqq.). We have already met with *καιρὸς* in Plato, Isocrates, and Alcidas (supra, p. 196). According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Verb.* c. 12) Gorgias first wrote περὶ καιροῦ.<sup>1</sup> The famous first aphorism of Hippocrates touches on the theme in the words ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὄξυς. Democritus (fr. 226 Diels, if genuine) says κίνδυνος δὲ ἡ τοῦ

<sup>1</sup> Süss accordingly refers everything on the subject to Gorgias as source.

καιροῦ διάγνωσις. And, what is more to our purpose, the comic poets parodied this favorite catchword of the professors of rhetoric, medicine, and the other arts. In the Θεσμοφόρος of Dionysius (Kock, II, p. 424) the learned cook declares:

“The cook book of Archestratos is deemed  
By some most helpful, but I tell you, sir,  
There's nothing in it. Precepts cannot teach  
Things that no art can fix, and cookery  
Cannot be written down in black and white.  
The καιρός cannot be defined by rule,  
The opportunity, the happy moment;  
Observe all precepts of your art and miss  
The season seasoning all, your art is vain.”

Χρόνον, inserted after καιρὸν instead of immediately after μελέτη, probably for metrical convenience, is merely the long study that all teachers demand and all great things require. Cf. e.g. *Anon. Iambl.* Diels, 577, 37-42. *Epistolae Chionis*, XI (Hercher, p. 200) ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀρετὴν ἐμπορευνόμεθα οὐδενὸς ἄλλου πλὴν φύσεως καὶ φιλοπονίας καὶ χρόνου ὧμιον. It is Dante's *lungo studio*, Isocrates' (*Pan.* 14) τοῦ χρόνου μὴ μόνον τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν διατριφθέντος, etc. It has of course nothing to do with the appeal to time or posterity as the best judge, for which, with some remarks on καιρός, cf. Butcher, *Harvard Lectures*, 177, 117 sqq.

Κριτὴν, etc. The distinction of criticism from creative power appears early. It is found in Thucydides, II, 40, and III, 37, though rather with reference to judging the policies than the art of a speaker. The Platonic Hippias invites Socrates to bring to his lecture hearers οἵτινες ἱκανοὶ ἀκούσαντες κρίναι τὰ λεγόμενα (286 C). Isocrates boasts that his teaching even when it fails to turn out professional ἀγωνιστάς, makes cultured laymen, τῶν τε λόγων κριτὰς . . . ἀκριβεστέρους (15, 204). And Aristotle regards criticism rather than virtuosity as the aim of the ordinary man's study of music and painting. But we need not follow this line of thought further nor trace the meaning of κριτικός among the Alexandrians. (Cf. San-

dys, I, 10.) The comic poet is thinking of the judges in the theatre, or of the whole audience as judges. For as Aristotle says, the *θεατής* of a poem or epideictic speech is the *κριτής* on whom its success depends. And the comic poets hardly distinguish the appeal to the audience from the appeal to the judges.<sup>1</sup> They feel with Touchstone that "when a man's verses cannot be understood nor a man's wit seconded with the forward child understanding, it strikes a man more dead than a great reckoning in a little room." Hence Aristophanes' many appeals to the intelligence of the audience. *Eg.* 233 τὸ γὰρ θέατρον δεξιόν; *Nubes* 521 θεατὰς δεξιούς; cf. 575; *Frogs* 1109, 1115. A stupid hearer in the audience is a bad thing, says Philemon (K. 143), for he blames the poet, not himself. The work of art must be supplemented by appreciation, he tells us elsewhere (72, 4):

There is no profit in the sculptured stone  
Or glowing canvas, if the artist's work  
Find no discerning eye to feel their beauty,

ἀν μὴ τὸν αἰσθησόμενον ἡ τέχνη λάβῃ. So in parody of the thought, Alexis ap. Athen. ix, 379 B:

The cook's sole duty is to cook the dinner.  
Let him who is to eat and judge it (*κρινεῖν*) come  
In season (*εἰς καιρόν*), then art does its perfect work.

It is not, however, the mere term "judge" but its combination with the pregnant word *συνάρπασαι*, that excites Professor Saintsbury's admiration. After translating it in italics "a critic able to *grasp what is said*," he coins the phrase "critical *συνάρπασμα*," p. 198, and alludes to it again as a "really 'grasping' judgment," p. 227. In all this he is of course pressing the etymology far more than the Greeks did, to whom the word signified little more than the quickness of apprehension eminently desirable in a student or an audience. It is used with comic effect of snapping up what the teacher

<sup>1</sup> So already Cratinus ap. Hephaest. 15, p. 88:

Χαῖρ', ὦ μέγ' ἀχρεύγελος ὄμιλε, ταῖς ἐπὶ βδαῖς,  
τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτῆς ἀριστε πάντων.



throws out in Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 775 ἄγε δὴ ταχέως τουτὶ ξυνάρπασον. In 490 ὑφαρπάσει is used and the allusion to the dog is explicit. Cf. further, Soph. *Ajax* 16 συναρπάζω φρενί; Alexis (Kock, II, p. 311):

καὶ τὴν τέχνην μὲν οὐ πάνν  
ἐξέμαθε, τὴν δ' ἀρτηρίαν συνήρπασεν;

the phrases συναρπάζειν τὸ ζητούμενον, and (in *Διαλέξεις* 5) συναρπάσαι τὰ πολλὰ ὀλίγα μαθών. The word plainly conveys no suggestion of a *comprehensive* critical judgment.

The next two lines (8, 9) have already received sufficient illustration (*supra*, p. 187 sq.). In the line of recapitulation (10) μελέτη is replaced by ἐπιμέλεια, care, painstaking, a frequent virtual synonym in the earlier rhetorical and ethical literature of the subject and especially in Isocrates and Plato.

Εὐταξία seems to introduce a new point naturally suggested by ἐπιμέλεια, but it may also serve to repeat καιρός. The two ideas, though not the terms, are associated in *Phaedrus*, 268 sqq.; e.g. in 268 B ὅποτε is the καιρός of medicine, and in 268 D τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν ἀλλήλοις, etc., implies the τάξις or εὐταξία of good literature.<sup>1</sup> But this is doing Simulus too much honor. He merely catches up a familiar term of rhetoric or literary criticism to round out the line, and might have used οἰκονομία had it fitted the measure. It is Alcidas' ἐν τάξει θείναι (24) and Horace's *lucidus ordo* (*A. P.* 41). Yet, as the next line shows that Simulus is beginning to confound literary criticism with ethics, or the general conduct of life, it is possible that εὐταξία is to be taken in the ethical sense for which alone the lexicons cite it.<sup>2</sup>

The last line adds not very relevantly a Platonic thought which became a commonplace of parainetic. Cf. Plato, *Laches*, 188 B καὶ ἀξιούντα μανθάνειν ἕωςπερ ἂν ζῇ, καὶ μὴ οἰόμενον αὐτὸ τὸ γῆρας νοῦν ἔχον προσιέναι. It is found also in a perhaps spurious fragment of Democritus (183 Diels, 1)

<sup>1</sup> This also Süss, p. 90, refers to Gorgias because of the emphasis laid on τάξις in the *Helena*.

<sup>2</sup> It is used of the easily remembered order of rhythmical words by Longinus, Spengel, I, 316, 22.

χρόνος γὰρ οὐ διδάσκει φρονεῖν ἀλλ' ὥραίη τροφή καὶ φύσις.  
Cf. Publil. Syrus, Meyer, n. 590 Sensus, non aetas, invenit sapientiam.

Commentary of this sort might be extended indefinitely, and I have already perhaps crossed the line where pedantry begins. But a mere statement of opinion would have produced no impression against the testimony of the two admirable and widely known books that have given to these lines a factitious significance. It was necessary to prove to superfluity their commonplace quality by a history of the ideas which they express.